Syllabus

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether the use of race
as a factor in student admissions by the University of
Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.

I
A

The Law School ranks among the Nation’s top law
schools. It receives more than 3,500 applications each
year for a class of around 350 students. Seeking to “admit
a group of students who individually and collectively are
among the most capable,” the Law School looks for indi-
viduals with “substantial promise for success in law
school” and “a strong likelihood of succeeding in the prac-
tice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-
being of others.” App. 110. More broadly, the Law School
seeks “a mix of students with varying backgrounds and
experiences who will respect and learn from each other.”
Ibid. In 1992, the dean of the Law School charged a
faculty committee with crafting a written admissions
policy to implement these goals. In particular, the Law
School sought to ensure that its efforts to achieve student

2

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

body diversity complied with this Court’s most recent
ruling on the use of race in university admissions. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978).
Upon the unanimous adoption of the committee’s report by
the Law School faculty, it became the Law School’s official
admissions policy.

The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic
ability coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants’
talents, experiences, and potential “to contribute to the
learning of those around them.” App. 111. The policy
requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant
based on all the information available in the file, including
a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an
essay describing the ways in which the applicant will
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School. Id.,
at 83—84, 114—121. In reviewing an applicant’s file, ad-
missions officials must consider the applicant’s under-
graduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) score because they are important
(if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school.
Id., at 112. The policy stresses that “no applicant should
be admitted unless we expect that applicant to do well
enough to graduate with no serious academic problems.”
Id., at 111.

The policy makes clear, however, that even the highest
possible score does not guarantee admission to the Law
School. Id., at 113. Nor does a low score automatically
disqualify an applicant. Ibid. Rather, the policy requires
admissions officials to look beyond grades and test scores
to other criteria that are important to the Law School’s
educational objectives. Id., at 114. So-called “ ‘soft’ vari-
ables” such as “the enthusiasm of recommenders, the
quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the
applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate
course selection” are all brought to bear in assessing
an “applicant’s likely contributions to the intellec-

3

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

tual and social life of the institution.” Ibid.

The policy aspires to “achieve that diversity which has
the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its
parts.” Id., at 118. The policy does not restrict the types
of diversity contributions eligible for “substantial weight”
in the admissions process, but instead recognizes “many
possible bases for diversity admissions.” Id., at 118, 120.
The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School’s long-
standing commitment to “one particular type of diversity,”
that is, “racial and ethnic diversity with special reference
to the inclusion of students from groups which have been
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this com-
mitment might not be represented in our student body in
meaningful numbers.” Id., at 120. By enrolling a “ ‘critical
mass’ of [underrepresented] minority students,” the Law
School seeks to “ensur[e] their ability to make unique
contributions to the character of the Law School.” Id., at
120—121.

The policy does not define diversity “solely in terms of
racial and ethnic status.” Id., at 121. Nor is the policy
“insensitive to the competition among all students for
admission to the [L]aw [S]chool.” Ibid. Rather, the policy
seeks to guide admissions officers in “producing classes
both diverse and academically outstanding, classes made
up of students who promise to continue the tradition of
outstanding contribution by Michigan Graduates to the
legal profession.” Ibid.

B

Petitioner Barbara Grutter is a white Michigan resident
who applied to the Law School in 1996 with a 3.8 grade
point average and 161 LSAT score. The Law School ini-
tially placed petitioner on a waiting list, but subsequently
rejected her application. In December 1997, petitioner

4

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

filed suit in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan against the Law School, the Re-
gents of the University of Michigan, Lee Bollinger (Dean
of the Law School from 1987 to 1994, and President of the
University of Michigan from 1996 to 2002), Jeffrey Leh-
man (Dean of the Law School), and Dennis Shields (Direc-
tor of Admissions at the Law School from 1991 until 1998).
Petitioner alleged that respondents discriminated against
her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d; and Rev. Stat. §1977, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. §1981.

Petitioner further alleged that her application was
rejected because the Law School uses race as a “predomi-
nant” factor, giving applicants who belong to certain mi-
nority groups “a significantly greater chance of admission
than students with similar credentials from disfavored
racial groups.” App. 33—34. Petitioner also alleged that
respondents “had no compelling interest to justify their
use of race in the admissions process.” Id., at 34. Peti-
tioner requested compensatory and punitive damages, an
order requiring the Law School to offer her admission, and
an injunction prohibiting the Law School from continuing
to discriminate on the basis of race. Id., at 36. Petitioner
clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit. Northeastern
Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993).

The District Court granted petitioner’s motion for class
certification and for bifurcation of the trial into liability
and damages phases. The class was defined as “ ‘all per-
sons who (A) applied for and were not granted admission
to the University of Michigan Law School for the academic
years since (and including) 1995 until the time that judg-
ment is entered herein; and (B) were members of those
racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that Defen-
dants treated less favorably in considering their applica-

5

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

tions for admission to the Law School.’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 191a—192a.

The District Court heard oral argument on the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment on December 22,
2000. Taking the motions under advisement, the District
Court indicated that it would decide as a matter of law
whether the Law School’s asserted interest in obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body was compelling. The District Court also indicated
that it would conduct a bench trial on the extent to which
race was a factor in the Law School’s admissions decisions,
and whether the Law School’s consideration of race in
admissions decisions constituted a race-based double
standard.

During the 15-day bench trial, the parties introduced
extensive evidence concerning the Law School’s use of race
in the admissions process. Dennis Shields, Director of
Admissions when petitioner applied to the Law School,
testified that he did not direct his staff to admit a par-
ticular percentage or number of minority students, but
rather to consider an applicant’s race along with all other
factors. Id., at 206a. Shields testified that at the height of
the admissions season, he would frequently consult the so-
called “daily reports” that kept track of the racial and
ethnic composition of the class (along with other informa-
tion such as residency status and gender). Id., at 207a.
This was done, Shields testified, to ensure that a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students would be
reached so as to realize the educational benefits of a di-
verse student body. Ibid. Shields stressed, however, that
he did not seek to admit any particular number or per-
centage of underrepresented minority students. Ibid.

Erica Munzel, who succeeded Shields as Director of
Admissions, testified that “ ‘critical mass’” means
“‘meaningful numbers’” or “‘meaningful representation,’ ”
which she understood to mean a number that encourages

6

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

underrepresented minority students to participate in the
classroom and not feel isolated. Id., at 208a—209a. Mun-
zel stated there is no number, percentage, or range of
numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass. Id.,
at 209a. Munzel also asserted that she must consider the
race of applicants because a critical mass of underrepre-
sented minority students could not be enrolled if admis-
sions decisions were based primarily on undergraduate
GPAs and LSAT scores. Ibid.

The current Dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Lehman,
also testified. Like the other Law School witnesses, Leh-
man did not quantify critical mass in terms of numbers or
percentages. Id., at 211a. He indicated that critical mass
means numbers such that underrepresented minority
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their
race. Ibid. When asked about the extent to which race is
considered in admissions, Lehman testified that it varies
from one applicant to another. Ibid. In some cases, ac-
cording to Lehman’s testimony, an applicant’s race may
play no role, while in others it may be a “ ‘determinative’”
factor. Ibid.

The District Court heard extensive testimony from
Professor Richard Lempert, who chaired the faculty com-
mittee that drafted the 1992 policy. Lempert emphasized
that the Law School seeks students with diverse interests
and backgrounds to enhance classroom discussion and the
educational experience both inside and outside the class-
room. Id., at 213a. When asked about the policy’s
“‘commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which
have been historically discriminated against,’ ” Lempert
explained that this language did not purport to remedy
past discrimination, but rather to include students who
may bring to the Law School a perspective different from
that of members of groups which have not been the vic-
tims of such discrimination. Ibid. Lempert acknowledged

7

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

that other groups, such as Asians and Jews, have experi-
enced discrimination, but explained they were not men-
tioned in the policy because individuals who are members
of those groups were already being admitted to the Law
School in significant numbers. Ibid.

Kent Syverud was the final witness to testify about the
Law School’s use of race in admissions decisions. Syverud
was a professor at the Law School when the 1992 admis-
sions policy was adopted and is now Dean of Vanderbilt
Law School. In addition to his testimony at trial, Syverud
submitted several expert reports on the educational bene-
fits of diversity. Syverud’s testimony indicated that when
a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonmi-
nority students learn there is no “‘minority viewpoint’ ”
but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu-
dents. Id., at 215a.

In an attempt to quantify the extent to which the Law
School actually considers race in making admissions
decisions, the parties introduced voluminous evidence at
trial. Relying on data obtained from the Law School,
petitioner’s expert, Dr. Kinley Larntz, generated and
analyzed “admissions grids” for the years in question
(1995—2000). These grids show the number of applicants
and the number of admittees for all combinations of GPAs
and LSAT scores. Dr. Larntz made “‘cell-by-cell’” com-
parisons between applicants of different races to deter-
mine whether a statistically significant relationship ex-
isted between race and admission rates. He concluded
that membership in certain minority groups “‘is an ex-
tremely strong factor in the decision for acceptance,’” and
that applicants from these minority groups “‘are given an
extremely large allowance for admission’” as compared to
applicants who are members of nonfavored groups. Id., at
218a—220a. Dr. Larntz conceded, however, that race is not
the predominant factor in the Law School’s admissions

8

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

calculus. 12 Tr. 11—13 (Feb. 10, 2001).

Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the Law School’s expert,
focused on the predicted effect of eliminating race as a
factor in the Law School’s admission process. In Dr.
Raudenbush’s view, a race-blind admissions system would
have a “‘very dramatic,’” negative effect on underrepre-
sented minority admissions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a.
He testified that in 2000, 35 percent of underrepresented
minority applicants were admitted. Ibid. Dr. Raudenbush
predicted that if race were not considered, only 10 percent
of those applicants would have been admitted. Ibid.
Under this scenario, underrepresented minority students
would have comprised 4 percent of the entering class in
2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent. Ibid.

In the end, the District Court concluded that the Law
School’s use of race as a factor in admissions decisions was
unlawful. Applying strict scrutiny, the District Court
determined that the Law School’s asserted interest in
assembling a diverse student body was not compelling
because “the attainment of a racially diverse class … was
not recognized as such by Bakke and is not a remedy for
past discrimination.” Id., at 246a. The District Court
went on to hold that even if diversity were compelling, the
Law School had not narrowly tailored its use of race to
further that interest. The District Court granted peti-
tioner’s request for declaratory relief and enjoined the Law
School from using race as a factor in its admissions deci-
sions. The Court of Appeals entered a stay of the injunc-
tion pending appeal.

Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reversed the Dis-
trict Court’s judgment and vacated the injunction. The
Court of Appeals first held that Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke was binding precedent establishing diversity as a
compelling state interest. According to the Court of Ap-
peals, Justice Powell’s opinion with respect to diversity
comprised the controlling rationale for the judgment of this

9

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

Court under the analysis set forth in Marks v. United
States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977). The Court of Appeals also held
that the Law School’s use of race was narrowly tailored
because race was merely a “potential ‘plus’ factor” and
because the Law School’s program was “virtually identical”
to the Harvard admissions program described approvingly
by Justice Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion. 288
F. 3d 732, 746, 749 (CA6 2002).

Four dissenting judges would have held the Law
School’s use of race unconstitutional. Three of the dis-
senters, rejecting the majority’s Marks analysis, examined
the Law School’s interest in student body diversity on the
merits and concluded it was not compelling. The fourth
dissenter, writing separately, found it unnecessary to
decide whether diversity was a compelling interest be-
cause, like the other dissenters, he believed that the Law
School’s use of race was not narrowly tailored to further
that interest.

We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1043 (2002), to resolve
the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a ques-
tion of national importance: Whether diversity is a com-
pelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use
of race in selecting applicants for admission to public
universities. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932
(CA5 1996) (Hopwood I) (holding that diversity is not a
compelling state interest), with Smith v. University of
Wash. Law School, 233 F. 3d 1188 (CA9 2000) (holding
that it is).

II
A

We last addressed the use of race in public higher edu-
cation over 25 years ago. In the landmark Bakke case, we
reviewed a racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of
100 seats in a medical school class for members of certain
minority groups. 438 U. S. 265 (1978). The decision pro-

10

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

duced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a
majority of the Court. Four Justices would have upheld
the program against all attack on the ground that the
government can use race to “remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice.” Id., at 325 (joint
opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Four other Justices avoided the constitutional question
altogether and struck down the program on statutory
grounds. Id., at 408 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by
Burger, C. J., and Stewart and REHNQUIST, JJ., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Powell provided a fifth vote not only for invalidating the
set-aside program, but also for reversing the state court’s
injunction against any use of race whatsoever. The only
holding for the Court in Bakke was that a “State has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a
properly devised admissions program involving the com-
petitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.” Id., at
320. Thus, we reversed that part of the lower court’s
judgment that enjoined the university “from any consid-
eration of the race of any applicant.” Ibid.

Since this Court’s splintered decision in Bakke, Justice
Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of
race-conscious admissions policies. Public and private
universities across the Nation have modeled their own
admissions programs on Justice Powell’s views on permis-
sible race-conscious policies. See, e.g., Brief for Judith
Areen et al. as Amici Curiae 12—13 (law school admissions
programs employ “methods designed from and based on
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke”); Brief for Amherst
College et al. as Amici Curiae 27 (“After Bakke, each of the
amici (and undoubtedly other selective colleges and uni-
versities as well) reviewed their admissions procedures in
light of Justice Powell’s opinion … and set sail accord-

11

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

ingly”). We therefore discuss Justice Powell’s opinion in
some detail.

Justice Powell began by stating that “[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same
protection, then it is not equal.” Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289—
290. In Justice Powell’s view, when governmental deci-
sions “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic back-
ground, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tai-
lored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Id., at
299. Under this exacting standard, only one of the inter-
ests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell’s
scrutiny.

First, Justice Powell rejected an interest in “ ‘reducing
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in
medical schools and in the medical profession’” as an
unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id., at 306—307.
Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying
societal discrimination because such measures would risk
placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties
“who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the benefi-
ciaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered.” Id., at 310. Third, Justice Powell rejected
an interest in “increasing the number of physicians who
will practice in communities currently underserved,”
concluding that even if such an interest could be compel-
ling in some circumstances the program under review was
not “geared to promote that goal.” Id., at 306, 310.

Justice Powell approved the university’s use of race to
further only one interest: “the attainment of a diverse
student body.” Id., at 311. With the important proviso
that “constitutional limitations protecting individual
rights may not be disregarded,” Justice Powell grounded
his analysis in the academic freedom that “long has been

12

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.” Id.,
at 312, 314. Justice Powell emphasized that nothing less
than the “‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students
as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.” Id., at 313
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of
N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967)). In seeking the “right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the
‘robust exchange of ideas,’ ” a university seeks “to achieve
a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment
of its mission.” 438 U. S., at 313. Both “tradition and
experience lend support to the view that the contribution
of diversity is substantial.” Ibid.

Justice Powell was, however, careful to emphasize that
in his view race “is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body.” Id., at 314. For Justice
Powell, “[i]t is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in
which a specified percentage of the student body is in
effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic
groups,” that can justify the use of race. Id., at 315.
Rather, “[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element.” Ibid.

In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts
have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell’s diver-
sity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no
other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under
Marks. In that case, we explained that “[w]hen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale ex-
plaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.” 430 U. S., at 193 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). As the divergent opinions of

13

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

the lower courts demonstrate, however, “[t]his test is more
easily stated than applied to the various opinions sup-
porting the result in [Bakke].” Nichols v. United States,
511 U. S. 738, 745—746 (1994). Compare, e.g., Johnson v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F. 3d 1234 (CA11
2001) (Justice Powell’s diversity rationale was not the
holding of the Court); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F. 3d 256,
274—275 (CA5 2000) (Hopwood II) (same); Hopwood I, 78
F. 3d 932 (same), with Smith v. University of Wash. Law
School, 233 F. 3d 1199 (Justice Powell’s opinion, including
the diversity rationale, is controlling under Marks).

We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice
Powell’s opinion is binding under Marks. It does not seem
“useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the
lower courts that have considered it.” Nichols v. United
States, supra, at 745—746. More important, for the rea-
sons set out below, today we endorse Justice Powell’s view
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest
that can justify the use of race in university admissions.

B

The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §2. Be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not
groups,” all “governmental action based on race—a group
classification long recognized as in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been in-
fringed.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200,
227 (1995) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). We are a “free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) (internal quotation marks

14

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

and citation omitted). It follows from that principle that
“government may treat people differently because of their
race only for the most compelling reasons.” Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S., at 227.

We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.” Ibid. This means that such classifica-
tions are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
to further compelling governmental interests. “Absent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures,” we have no way to determine what
“classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifi-
cations are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to
“‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
[government] is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Ibid.

Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, supra, at 237 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Although all
governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny,
not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained,
“whenever the government treats any person unequally
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.” 515
U. S., at 229—230. But that observation “says nothing
about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that
determination is the job of the court applying strict scru-
tiny.” Id., at 230. When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest, such action
does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is
also satisfied.

15

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

Context matters when reviewing race-based governmen-
tal action under the Equal Protection Clause. See Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343—344 (1960) (admon-
ishing that, “in dealing with claims under broad provisions
of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpre-
tive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative
that generalizations, based on and qualified by the con-
crete situations that gave rise to them, must not be ap-
plied out of context in disregard of variant controlling
facts”). In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, we made
clear that strict scrutiny must take “ ‘relevant differences’
into account.” 515 U. S., at 228. Indeed, as we explained,
that is its “fundamental purpose.” Ibid. Not every deci-
sion influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use
of race in that particular context.

III
A

With these principles in mind, we turn to the question
whether the Law School’s use of race is justified by a
compelling state interest. Before this Court, as they have
throughout this litigation, respondents assert only one
justification for their use of race in the admissions process:
obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from a di-
verse student body.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al.
i. In other words, the Law School asks us to recognize, in
the context of higher education, a compelling state interest
in student body diversity.

We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School’s
argument has been foreclosed, either expressly or implic-
itly, by our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke.
It is true that some language in those opinions might be
read to suggest that remedying past discrimination is the

16

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

only permissible justification for race-based governmental
action. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., supra, at
493 (plurality opinion) (stating that unless classifications
based on race are “strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility”). But we have never
held that the only governmental use of race that can sur-
vive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. Nor,
since Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in
the context of public higher education. Today, we hold
that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining
a diverse student body.

The Law School’s educational judgment that such diver-
sity is essential to its educational mission is one to which
we defer. The Law School’s assessment that diversity will,
in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by
respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest
asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into
account complex educational judgments in an area that
lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our
holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits. See Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225 (1985); Board of
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 96, n. 6
(1978); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 (opinion of Powell,
J.).

We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university envi-
ronment, universities occupy a special niche in our consti-
tutional tradition. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U. S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S., at 603. In

17

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

announcing the principle of student body diversity as a
compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases
recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the
First Amendment, of educational autonomy: “The freedom
of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body.” Bakke, supra,
at 312. From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that
by claiming “the right to select those students who will
contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’ ” a
university “seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission.” 438 U. S., at
313 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State
of N. Y., supra, at 603). Our conclusion that the Law
School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body
is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institu-
tional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a uni-
versity is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”
438 U. S., at 318—319.

As part of its goal of “assembling a class that is both
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse,”
the Law School seeks to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority
students.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 13. The
Law School’s interest is not simply “to assure within its
student body some specified percentage of a particular
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.” Bakke,
438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). That would
amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional. Ibid.; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467,
494 (1992) (“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own
sake”); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S., at 507.
Rather, the Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined
by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.

These benefits are substantial. As the District Court
emphasized, the Law School’s admissions policy promotes

18

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

“cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a.
These benefits are “important and laudable,” because
“classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting” when the students
have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” Id.,
at 246a, 244a.

The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is fur-
ther bolstered by its amici, who point to the educational
benefits that flow from student body diversity. In addition
to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at
trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and “better prepares stud-
ents for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals.” Brief for
American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape
of the River (1998); Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the
Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield & M. Kurlaender
eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence
on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities
(M. Chang, D. Witt, J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 2003).

These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only
be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief for 3M et al. as
Amici Curiae 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus
Curiae 3—4. What is more, high-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the United States military assert
that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,” a “highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps … is essential to
the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to
provide national security.” Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr.
et al. as Amici Curiae 27. The primary sources for the

19

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the latter com-
prising students already admitted to participating colleges
and universities. Id., at 5. At present, “the military can-
not achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified
and racially diverse unless the service academies and the
ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admis-
sions policies.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). To fulfill its
mission, the military “must be selective in admissions for
training and education for the officer corps, and it must
train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps in a racially diverse setting.” Id., at 29 (em-
phasis in original). We agree that “[i]t requires only a
small step from this analysis to conclude that our coun-
try’s other most selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective.” Ibid.

We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding impor-
tance of preparing students for work and citizenship,
describing education as pivotal to “sustaining our political
and cultural heritage” with a fundamental role in main-
taining the fabric of society. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202,
221 (1982). This Court has long recognized that “educa-
tion … is the very foundation of good citizenship.” Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). For this
reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity
through public institutions of higher education must be
accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.
The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms that
“[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available
to all segments of American society, including people of all
races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government
objective.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
And, “[n]owhere is the importance of such openness more
acute than in the context of higher education.” Ibid.
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the

20

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our
Nation’s leaders. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634
(1950) (describing law school as a “proving ground for legal
learning and practice”). Individuals with law degrees
occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than
half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than
a third of the seats in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. See Brief for Association of American Law
Schools as Amicus Curiae 5—6. The pattern is even more
striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A
handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United
States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals
judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States
District Court judges. Id., at 6.

In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in
the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified indi-
viduals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the open-
ness and integrity of the educational institutions that
provide this training. As we have recognized, law schools
“cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts.” See Sweatt v.
Painter, supra, at 634. Access to legal education (and thus
the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that
all members of our heterogeneous society may participate
in the educational institutions that provide the training
and education necessary to succeed in America.

The Law School does not premise its need for critical
mass on “any belief that minority students always (or even
consistently) express some characteristic minority view-
point on any issue.” Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al.
30. To the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereo-

21

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

types is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission,
and one that it cannot accomplish with only token num-
bers of minority students. Just as growing up in a par-
ticular region or having particular professional experi-
ences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s
own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a
society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters. The Law School has determined, based on its
experience and expertise, that a “critical mass” of under-
represented minorities is necessary to further its compel-
ling interest in securing the educational benefits of a
diverse student body.

B

Even in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state
interest, government is still “constrained in how it may
pursue that end: [T]he means chosen to accomplish the
[government’s] asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.” Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 908 (1996) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The purpose of the narrow tailoring
requirement is to ensure that “the means chosen ‘fit’ …
th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was ille-
gitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.” Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S., at 493 (plurality opinion).

Since Bakke, we have had no occasion to define the
contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to
race-conscious university admissions programs. That
inquiry must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised
by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public
higher education. Contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY’s assertions,
we do not “abandon[ ] strict scrutiny,” see post, at 8
(dissenting opinion). Rather, as we have already explained,
ante, at 15, we adhere to Adarand’s teaching that the very

22

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such “ relevant differ-
ences into account.” 515 U. S., at 228 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program cannot use a quota system—it cannot “insulat[e]
each category of applicants with certain desired qualifica-
tions from competition with all other applicants.” Bakke,
supra, at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.). Instead, a university
may consider race or ethnicity only as a “‘plus’ in a particu-
lar applicant’s file,” without “insulat[ing] the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats.” Id., at 317. In other words, an admissions program
must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consid-
eration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight.” Ibid.

We find that the Law School’s admissions program
bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. As Jus-
tice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized
consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that
universities cannot establish quotas for members of cer-
tain racial groups or put members of those groups on
separate admissions tracks. See id., at 315—316. Nor can
universities insulate applicants who belong to certain
racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission.
Ibid. Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity
more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of individu-
alized consideration of each and every applicant. Ibid.

We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions pro-
gram, like the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell,
does not operate as a quota. Properly understood, a
“quota” is a program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are “reserved exclusively for
certain minority groups.” Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,

23

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

supra, at 496 (plurality opinion). Quotas “‘impose a fixed
number or percentage which must be attained, or which
cannot be exceeded,’ ” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478
U. S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), and “insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats.” Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.). In
contrast, “a permissible goal … require[s] only a good-
faith effort … to come within a range demarcated by the
goal itself,” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, at 495,
and permits consideration of race as a “plus” factor in any
given case while still ensuring that each candidate “com-
pete[s] with all other qualified applicants,” Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616,
638 (1987).

Justice Powell’s distinction between the medical school’s
rigid 16-seat quota and Harvard’s flexible use of race as a
“plus” factor is instructive. Harvard certainly had mini-
mum goals for minority enrollment, even if it had no
specific number firmly in mind. See Bakke, supra, at 323
(opinion of Powell, J.) (“10 or 20 black students could not
begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the
variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of
blacks in the United States”). What is more, Justice Pow-
ell flatly rejected the argument that Harvard’s program
was “the functional equivalent of a quota” merely because
it had some “ ‘plus’ ” for race, or gave greater “weight” to
race than to some other factors, in order to achieve stu-
dent body diversity. 438 U. S., at 317—318.

The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform
its program into a quota. As the Harvard plan described
by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course “some
relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits
to be derived from a diverse student body, and between
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for

24

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

those students admitted.” Id., at 323. “[S]ome attention
to numbers,” without more, does not transform a flexible
admissions system into a rigid quota. Ibid. Nor, as
JUSTICE KENNEDY posits, does the Law School’s consulta-
tion of the “daily reports,” which keep track of the racial
and ethnic composition of the class (as well as of residency
and gender), “suggest[ ] there was no further attempt at
individual review save for race itself” during the final
stages of the admissions process. See post, at 6 (dissenting
opinion). To the contrary, the Law School’s admissions
officers testified without contradiction that they never
gave race any more or less weight based on the informa-
tion contained in these reports. Brief for Respondents
Bollinger et al. 43, n. 70 (citing App. in Nos. 01—1447 and
01—1516 (CA6), p. 7336). Moreover, as JUSTICE KENNEDY
concedes, see post, at 4, between 1993 and 2000, the num-
ber of African-American, Latino, and Native-American
students in each class at the Law School varied from 13.5
to 20.1 percent, a range inconsistent with a quota.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE believes that the Law School’s
policy conceals an attempt to achieve racial balancing, and
cites admissions data to contend that the Law School
discriminates among different groups within the critical
mass. Post, at 3—9 (dissenting opinion). But, as THE
CHIEF JUSTICE concedes, the number of underrepresented
minority students who ultimately enroll in the Law School
differs substantially from their representation in the appli-
cant pool and varies considerably for each group from year
to year. See post, at 8 (dissenting opinion).

That a race-conscious admissions program does not
operate as a quota does not, by itself, satisfy the require-
ment of individualized consideration. When using race as
a “plus” factor in university admissions, a university’s
admissions program must remain flexible enough to en-
sure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity

25

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

the defining feature of his or her application. The importance
of this individualized consideration in the context of
a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. See
Bakke, supra, at 318, n. 52 (opinion of Powell, J.) (identi-
fying the “denial … of th[e] right to individualized consid-
eration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school’s
admissions program).

Here, the Law School engages in a highly individual-
ized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contrib-
ute to a diverse educational environment. The Law School
affords this individualized consideration to applicants of
all races. There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of
automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single
“soft” variable. Unlike the program at issue in Gratz v.
Bollinger, ante, the Law School awards no mechanical,
predetermined diversity “bonuses” based on race or eth-
nicity. See ante, at 23 (distinguishing a race-conscious
admissions program that automatically awards 20 points
based on race from the Harvard plan, which considered
race but “did not contemplate that any single characteris-
tic automatically ensured a specific and identifiable con-
tribution to a university’s diversity”). Like the Harvard
plan, the Law School’s admissions policy “is flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and
to place them on the same footing for consideration, al-
though not necessarily according them the same weight.”
Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.).

We also find that, like the Harvard plan Justice Powell
referenced in Bakke, the Law School’s race-conscious
admissions program adequately ensures that all factors
that may contribute to student body diversity are meaning-
fully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.
With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented
minority students admitted by the Law School have been

26

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

deemed qualified. By virtue of our Nation’s struggle with
racial inequality, such students are both likely to have
experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s
mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful
numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences. See
App. 120.

The Law School does not, however, limit in any way the
broad range of qualities and experiences that may be
considered valuable contributions to student body diver-
sity. To the contrary, the 1992 policy makes clear “[t]here
are many possible bases for diversity admissions,” and
provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled
widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have over-
come personal adversity and family hardship, have excep-
tional records of extensive community service, and have
had successful careers in other fields. Id., at 118—119.
The Law School seriously considers each “applicant’s
promise of making a notable contribution to the class by
way of a particular strength, attainment, or characteris-
tic —e.g., an unusual intellectual achievement, employ-
ment experience, nonacademic performance, or personal
background.” Id., at 83—84. All applicants have the op-
portunity to highlight their own potential diversity contri-
butions through the submission of a personal statement,
letters of recommendation, and an essay describing the
ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and
diversity of the Law School.

What is more, the Law School actually gives substantial
weight to diversity factors besides race. The Law School
frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades
and test scores lower than underrepresented minority
applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are
rejected. See Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 10;
App. 121—122. This shows that the Law School seriously
weighs many other diversity factors besides race that can
make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority

27

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

applicants as well. By this flexible approach, the Law
School sufficiently takes into account, in practice as well
as in theory, a wide variety of characteristics besides race
and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse student body.
JUSTICE KENNEDY speculates that “race is likely outcome
determinative for many members of minority groups” who
do not fall within the upper range of LSAT scores and
grades. Post, at 3 (dissenting opinion). But the same
could be said of the Harvard plan discussed approvingly
by Justice Powell in Bakke, and indeed of any plan that
uses race as one of many factors. See 438 U. S., at 316
(“ ‘When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large
middle group of applicants who are “admissible” and
deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the
race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor’ ”).

Petitioner and the United States argue that the Law
School’s plan is not narrowly tailored because race-neutral
means exist to obtain the educational benefits of student
body diversity that the Law School seeks. We disagree.
Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a
university to choose between maintaining a reputation for
excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educa-
tional opportunities to members of all racial groups. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 280, n. 6
(1986) (alternatives must serve the interest “ ‘about as
well’ ”); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S., at 509—
510 (plurality opinion) (city had a “whole array of race-
neutral” alternatives because changing requirements
“would have [had] little detrimental effect on the city’s
interests”). Narrow tailoring does, however, require seri-
ous, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks. See id., at 507 (set-aside plan not narrowly tailored
where “there does not appear to have been any considera-
tion of the use of race-neutral means”); Wygant v. Jackson

28

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

Bd. of Ed., supra, at 280, n. 6 (narrow tailoring “require[s]
consideration” of “lawful alternative and less restrictive
means”).

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Law School
sufficiently considered workable race-neutral alternatives.
The District Court took the Law School to task for failing
to consider race-neutral alternatives such as “using a
lottery system” or “decreasing the emphasis for all appli-
cants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 251a. But these alternatives would require a
dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all
admitted students, or both.

The Law School’s current admissions program considers
race as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a
student body that is diverse in ways broader than race.
Because a lottery would make that kind of nuanced judg-
ment impossible, it would effectively sacrifice all other
educational values, not to mention every other kind of
diversity. So too with the suggestion that the Law School
simply lower admissions standards for all students, a
drastic remedy that would require the Law School to
become a much different institution and sacrifice a vital
component of its educational mission. The United States
advocates “percentage plans,” recently adopted by public
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and Califor-
nia to guarantee admission to all students above a certain
class-rank threshold in every high school in the State.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14—18. The
United States does not, however, explain how such plans
could work for graduate and professional schools. More-
over, even assuming such plans are race-neutral, they may
preclude the university from conducting the individualized
assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is
not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities
valued by the university. We are satisfied that the Law
School adequately considered race-neutral alternatives

29

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

currently capable of producing a critical mass without
forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectiv-
ity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission.

We acknowledge that “there are serious problems of
justice connected with the idea of preference itself.”
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.). Narrow
tailoring, therefore, requires that a race-conscious admis-
sions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group. Even remedial race-based governmental action
generally “remains subject to continuing oversight to
assure that it will work the least harm possible to other
innocent persons competing for the benefit.” Id., at 308.
To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program must not “unduly burden individuals who are not
members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.” Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 630 (1990)
(O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).

We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions pro-
gram does not. Because the Law School considers “all
pertinent elements of diversity,” it can (and does) select
nonminority applicants who have greater potential to
enhance student body diversity over underrepresented
minority applicants. See Bakke, supra, at 317 (opinion of
Powell, J.). As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, so long
as a race-conscious admissions program uses race as a
“plus” factor in the context of individualized consideration,
a rejected applicant

“will not have been foreclosed from all consideration
for that seat simply because he was not the right color
or had the wrong surname… His qualifications
would have been weighed fairly and competitively,
and he would have no basis to complain of unequal
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 438
U. S., at 318.

We agree that, in the context of its individualized inquiry

30

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants,
the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program does
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.

We are mindful, however, that “[a] core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all govern-
mentally imposed discrimination based on race.” Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 432 (1984). Accordingly, race-
conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.
This requirement reflects that racial classifications, how-
ever compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous
that they may be employed no more broadly than the
interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification
for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal
protection principle. We see no reason to exempt race-
conscious admissions programs from the requirement that
all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.
The Law School, too, concedes that all “race-conscious
programs must have reasonable durational limits.” Brief
for Respondents Bollinger et al. 32.

In the context of higher education, the durational re-
quirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-
conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to
determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity. Universities in California,
Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences
in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently
engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alterna-
tive approaches. Universities in other States can and
should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-
neutral alternatives as they develop. Cf. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring)
(“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best
solution is far from clear”).

The requirement that all race-conscious admissions
programs have a termination point “assure[s] all citizens

31

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of the Court

that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all
racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure
taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.” Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality
opinion); see also Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitu-
tionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Appli-
cants to Professional Schools, 58 Chicago Bar Rec. 282,
293 (May—June 1977) (“It would be a sad day indeed, were
America to become a quota-ridden society, with each
identifiable minority assigned proportional representation
in every desirable walk of life. But that is not the ration-
ale for programs of preferential treatment; the acid test of
their justification will be their efficacy in eliminating the
need for any racial or ethnic preferences at all”).

We take the Law School at its word that it would “like
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions
formula” and will terminate its race-conscious admissions
program as soon as practicable. See Brief for Respondents
Bollinger et al. 34; Bakke, supra, at 317—318 (opinion of
Powell, J.) (presuming good faith of university officials in
the absence of a showing to the contrary). It has been 25
years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context
of public higher education. Since that time, the number
of minority applicants with high grades and test scores
has indeed increased. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today.

In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body. Consequently, petitioner’s statutory claims

32

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court

based on Title VI and 42 U. S. C. §1981 also fail. See
Bakke, supra, at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Title VI …
proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amend-
ment”); General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 458 U. S. 375, 389—391 (1982) (the prohibition
against discrimination in §1981 is co-extensive with the
Equal Protection Clause). The judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, accordingly, is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,
concurring.

The Court’s observation that race-conscious programs
“must have a logical end point,” ante, at 29, accords with
the international understanding of the office of affirmative
action. The International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the
United States in 1994, see State Dept., Treaties in Force
422—423 (June 1996), endorses “special and concrete
measures to ensure the adequate development and protec-
tion of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and
equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental free-
doms.” Annex to G. A. Res. 2106, 20 U. N. GAOR Res.
Supp. (No. 14) 47, U. N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965). But
such measures, the Convention instructs, “shall in no case
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate rights for different racial groups after the objec-
tives for which they were taken have been achieved.” Ibid;
see also Art. 1(4) (similarly providing for temporally lim-
ited affirmative action); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Annex to
G. A. Res. 34/180, 34 U. N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 46) 194,
U. N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 4(1) (1979) (authorizing “tempo-
rary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto

2

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
GINSBURG, J., concurring

equality” that “shall be discontinued when the objectives
of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved”).

The Court further observes that “[i]t has been 25 years
since Justice Powell [in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978)] first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context
of public higher education.” Ante, at 31. For at least part
of that time, however, the law could not fairly be described
as “settled,” and in some regions of the Nation, overtly
race-conscious admissions policies have been proscribed.
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (CA5 1996); cf. Wess-
mann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790 (CA1 1998); Tuttle v. Ar-
lington Cty. School Bd., 195 F. 3d 698 (CA4 1999); John-
son v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F. 3d 1234
(CA11 2001). Moreover, it was only 25 years before Bakke
that this Court declared public school segregation unconsti-
tutional, a declaration that, after prolonged resistance,
yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself
the legacy of centuries of slavery. See Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U. S. 1 (1958).

It is well documented that conscious and unconscious
race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain
alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest
values and ideals. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, at 1—4
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 272—274 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dis-
senting); Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1251,
1276—1291, 1303 (1998). As to public education, data for
the years 2000—2001 show that 71.6% of African-American
children and 76.3% of Hispanic children attended a school
in which minorities made up a majority of the student
body. See E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield, A Multi-
racial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the

3

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
GINSBURG, J., concurring

Dream? p. 4 (Jan. 2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.
harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf
(as visited June 16, 2003, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file). And schools in predominantly minority commu-
nities lag far behind others measured by the educational
resources available to them. See id., at 11; Brief for Na-
tional Urban League et al. as Amici Curiae 11—12 (citing
General Accounting Office, Per-Pupil Spending Differ-
ences Between Selected Inner City and Suburban Schools
Varied by Metropolitan Area, 17 (2002)).

However strong the public’s desire for improved educa-
tion systems may be, see P. Hart & R. Teeter, A National
Priority: Americans Speak on Teacher Quality 2, 11 (2002)
(public opinion research conducted for Educational Testing
Service); The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L.
107—110, 115 Stat. 1425 , 20 U. S. C. A. §7231 (2003 Supp.
Pamphlet), it remains the current reality that many mi-
nority students encounter markedly inadequate and une-
qual educational opportunities. Despite these inequali-
ties, some minority students are able to meet the high
threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s
finest undergraduate and graduate educational institu-
tions. As lower school education in minority communities
improves, an increase in the number of such students may
be anticipated. From today’s vantage point, one may hope,
but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s
span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative
action.*

___________________
*As the Court explains, the admissions policy challenged here survives
review under the standards stated in Adarand Constructors, Inc .
v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200 (1995), Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469
(1989), and Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978). This case therefore does not require the Court to
revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether

4

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
GINSBURG, J., concurring

___________________
designed to benefit or to burden a historically disadvantaged group,
should be subject to the same standard of judicial review. Cf. Gratz,
ante, at 4—5 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U. S., at 274, n. 8
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Nor does this case necessitate reconsidera-
tion whether interests other than “student body diversity,” ante, at 13,
rank as sufficiently important to justify a race-conscious government
program. Cf. Gratz, ante, at 5 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515
U. S., at 273—274 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE. As he demon-
strates, the University of Michigan Law School’s mystical
“critical mass” justification for its discrimination by race
challenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions
statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially
proportionate admissions.

I also join Parts I through VII of JUSTICE THOMAS’s
opinion.* I find particularly unanswerable his central
point: that the allegedly “compelling state interest” at
issue here is not the incremental “educational benefit”
that emanates from the fabled “critical mass” of minority
students, but rather Michigan’s interest in maintaining a
“prestige” law school whose normal admissions standards
disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities. If
that is a compelling state interest, everything is.

I add the following: The “educational benefit” that the
University of Michigan seeks to achieve by racial dis-
crimination consists, according to the Court, of “‘cross-
racial
understanding,’” ante, at 18, and “ ‘better pre-

___________________
*Part VII of JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion describes those portions of the
Court’s opinion in which I concur. See post, at 27—31.

2

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of SCALIA, J.

par[ation of] students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society,’ ” ibid., all of which is necessary not
only for work, but also for good “citizenship,” ante, at 19.
This is not, of course, an “educational benefit” on which
students will be graded on their Law School transcript
(Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the
bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your
cross-racial understanding). For it is a lesson of life rather
than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather
learned by, for it cannot be “taught” in the usual sense)
people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than
the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law
School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to
public-school kindergartens. If properly considered an
“educational benefit” at all, it is surely not one that is
either uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely “teach-
able” in a formal educational setting. And therefore: If it is
appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to
use racial discrimination for the purpose of putting to-
gether a “critical mass” that will convey generic lessons in
socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less
appropriate—indeed, particularly appropriate—for the
civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so.
There, also, those exposed to “critical masses” of certain
races will presumably become better Americans, better
Michiganders, better civil servants. And surely private
employers cannot be criticized—indeed, should be
praised—if they also “teach” good citizenship to their adult
employees through a patriotic, all-American system of
racial discrimination in hiring. The nonminority indiv-
iduals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil serv-
ice job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will
surely understand.

Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial prefer-
ences in state educational institutions are impermissible,
or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial pref-

3

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of SCALIA, J.

erences in state educational institutions are OK, today’s
Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely de-
signed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. Some
future lawsuits will presumably focus on whether the
discriminatory scheme in question contains enough
evaluation of the applicant “as an individual,” ante, at 24,
and sufficiently avoids “separate admissions tracks” ante,
at 22, to fall under Grutter rather than Gratz. Some will
focus on whether a university has gone beyond the bounds
of a “ ‘good faith effort’ ” and has so zealously pursued its
“critical mass” as to make it an unconstitutional de facto
quota system, rather than merely “‘a permissible goal.’ ”
Ante, at 23 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478
U. S 421, 495 (1986) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). Other lawsuits may focus on
whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educa-
tional benefits flow from racial diversity. (That issue was
not contested in Grutter; and while the opinion accords “a
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,”
ante, at 16, “deference does not imply abandonment or
abdication of judicial review,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U. S. 322, 340 (2003).) Still other suits may challenge the
bona fides of the institution’s expressed commitment to
the educational benefits of diversity that immunize the
discriminatory scheme in Grutter. (Tempting targets, one
would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk
of multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but
walk the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their
campuses—through minority-only student organizations,
separate minority housing opportunities, separate minor-
ity student centers, even separate minority-only gradua-
tion ceremonies.) And still other suits may claim that the
institution’s racial preferences have gone below or above
the mystical Grutter-approved “critical mass.” Finally,
litigation can be expected on behalf of minority groups
intentionally short changed in the institution’s composi-

4

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of SCALIA, J.

tion of its generic minority “critical mass.” I do not look
forward to any of these cases. The Constitution proscribes
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-
provided education is no exception.

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins as to
Parts I—VII, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Frederick Douglass, speaking to a group of abolitionists
almost 140 years ago, delivered a message lost on today’s
majority:

“[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always
more that is benevolent, I perceive, than just, mani-
fested towards us. What I ask for the negro is not be-
nevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.
The American people have always been anxious to
know what they shall do with us… . I have had but
one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us!
Your doing with us has already played the mischief
with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not
remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are
worm-eaten at the core, if they are early ripe and disposed
to fall, let them fall! … And if the negro can-
not stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask
is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let
him alone! … [Y]our interference is doing him posi-
tive injury.” What the Black Man Wants: An Address
Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on 26 January
1865, reprinted in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers
59, 68 (J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds. 1991)
(emphasis in original).

2

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every ave-
nue of American life without the meddling of university
administrators. Because I wish to see all students suc-
ceed whatever their color, I share, in some respect, the
sympathies of those who sponsor the type of discrimina-
tion advanced by the University of Michigan Law School
(Law School). The Constitution does not, however, tolerate
institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions
policies when such devotion ripens into racial discrimination.
Nor does the Constitution countenance the unprece-
dented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an
approach inconsistent with the very concept of “strict
scrutiny.”

No one would argue that a university could set up a
lower general admission standard and then impose
heightened requirements only on black applicants. Simi-
larly, a university may not maintain a high admission
standard and grant exemptions to favored races. The Law
School, of its own choosing, and for its own purposes,
maintains an exclusionary admissions system that it
knows produces racially disproportionate results. Racial
discrimination is not a permissible solution to the self-
inflicted wounds of this elitist admissions policy.

The majority upholds the Law School’s racial discrimi-
nation not by interpreting the people’s Constitution, but
by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti.
Nevertheless, I concur in part in the Court’s opinion.
First, I agree with the Court insofar as its decision, which
approves of only one racial classification, confirms that
further use of race in admissions remains unlawful. Sec-
ond, I agree with the Court’s holding that racial discrimi-
nation in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25
years. See ante, at 31 (stating that racial discrimination
will no longer be narrowly tailored, or “necessary to fur-
ther” a compelling state interest, in 25 years). I respect-
fully dissent from the remainder of the Court’s opinion

3

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

and the judgment, however, because I believe that the
Law School’s current use of race violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and that the Constitution means the same
thing today as it will in 300 months.

I

The majority agrees that the Law School’s racial dis-
crimination at 14. Before applying that standard to this case, I
will briefly revisit the Court’s treatment of racial
classifications.

The strict scrutiny standard that the Court purports to
apply in this case was first enunciated in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). There the Court held
that “[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of [racial discrimination]; racial antagonism
never can.” Id., at 216. This standard of “pressing public
necessity” has more frequently been termed “compelling
governmental interest,”¹ see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
A majority of the Court has validated only two circum-
stances where “pressing public necessity” or a “compelling
state interest” can possibly justify racial discrimination by
state actors. First, the lesson of Korematsu is that na-
tional security constitutes a “pressing public necessity,”
though the government’s use of race to advance that objec-
tive must be narrowly tailored. Second, the Court has
recognized as a compelling state interest a government’s
effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is respon-
sible. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 504
(1989).

The contours of “pressing public necessity” can be fur-
ther discerned from those interests the Court has rejected

___________________
^1/       Throughout I will use the two phrases interchangeably.

4

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

as bases for racial discrimination. For example, Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986), found unconstitutional
a collective-bargaining agreement between a school
board and a teachers’ union that favored certain minority
races. The school board defended the policy on the
grounds that minority teachers provided “role models” for
minority students and that a racially “diverse” faculty
would improve the education of all students. See Brief for
Respondents, O. T. 1984, No. 84—1340, pp. 27—28; 476
U. S., at 315 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (“[A]n integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-
white faculty”). Nevertheless, the Court found that the
use of race violated the Equal Protection Clause, deeming
both asserted state interests insufficiently compelling.
Id., at 275—276 (plurality opinion); id., at 295 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“None of the interests asserted
by the [school board] … justify this racially discrimina-
tory layoff policy”).²

An even greater governmental interest involves the
sensitive role of courts in child custody determinations. In
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984), the Court held
that even the best interests of a child did not constitute a
compelling state interest that would allow a state court to
award custody to the father because the mother was in a
mixed-race marriage. Id., at 433 (finding the interest
“substantial” but holding the custody decision could not be
based on the race of the mother’s new husband).

Finally, the Court has rejected an interest in remedying

___________________
^2/       The Court’s refusal to address Wygant’s rejection of a state interest
virtually indistinguishable from that presented by the Law School is
perplexing. If the Court defers to the Law School’s judgment that a
racially mixed student body confers educational benefits to all, then
why would the Wygant Court not defer to the school board’s judgment
with respect to the benefits a racially mixed faculty confers?

5

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

general societal discrimination as a justification for race
discrimination. See Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality
opinion); Croson, 488 U. S., at 496—498 (plurality opinion);
id., at 520—521 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy” because a
“court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their
reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect
the future.” Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality opinion).
But see Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, p. ___ (GINSBURG, J.,
dissenting).

Where the Court has accepted only national security, and
rejected even the best interests of a child, as a justification
for racial discrimination, I conclude that only those meas-
ures the State must take to provide a bulwark against
anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a “pressing
public necessity.” Cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333, 334
(1968) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) (indicating that
protecting prisoners from violence might justify narrowly
tailored racial discrimination); Croson, supra, at 521
(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (“At least where state
or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to
the level of imminent danger to life and limb … can justify
[racial discrimination]”).

The Constitution abhors classifications based on race,
not only because those classifications can harm favored
races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also be-
cause every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. “Purchased at the
price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protec-
tion principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that
such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact
on the individual and our society.” Adarand Construction,
Inc. v. Peña,, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).

6

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

II

Unlike the majority, I seek to define with precision the
interest being asserted by the Law School before deter-
mining whether that interest is so compelling as to justify
racial discrimination. The Law School maintains that it
wishes to obtain “educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity,” Brief for Respondents Bollinger
et al. 14. This statement must be evaluated carefully,
because it implies that both “diversity” and “educational
benefits” are components of the Law School’s compelling
state interest. Additionally, the Law School’s refusal to
entertain certain changes in its admissions process and
status indicates that the compelling state interest it seeks
to validate is actually broader than might appear at first
glance.

Undoubtedly there are other ways to “better” the educa-
tion of law students aside from ensuring that the student
body contains a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority
students. Attaining “diversity,” whatever it
means,³ is the mechanism by which the Law School ob-

___________________
^3/       “[D]iversity,” for all of its devotees, is more a fashionable catch-
phrase than it is a useful term, especially when something as serious as
racial discrimination is at issue. Because the Equal Protection Clause
renders the color of one’s skin constitutionally irrelevant to the Law
School’s mission, I refer to the Law School’s interest as an “aesthetic.”
That is, the Law School wants to have a certain appearance, from the
shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the
students sitting at them.

I also use the term “aesthetic” because I believe it underlines the
ineffectiveness of racially discriminatory admissions in actually helping
those who are truly underprivileged. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 283
(1979) (noting that suspect classifications are especially impermissible
when “the choice made by the State appears to redound … to the benefit
of those without need for special solicitude”). It must be remembered
that the Law School’s racial discrimination does nothing for those too
poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education and therefore
presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our

7

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

tains educational benefits, not an end of itself. The Law
School, however, apparently believes that only a racially
mixed student body can lead to the educational benefits it
seeks. How, then, is the Law School’s interest in these
allegedly unique educational “benefits” not simply the
forbidden interest in “racial balancing,” ante, at 17, that
the majority expressly rejects?

A distinction between these two ideas (unique educa-
tional benefits based on racial aesthetics and race for its
own sake) is purely sophistic—so much so that the major-
ity uses them interchangeably. Compare ante, at 16
(“[T]he Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body”), with ante, at 21 (referring to the
“compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of
a diverse student body” (emphasis added)). The Law
School’s argument, as facile as it is, can only be under-
stood in one way: Classroom aesthetics yields educational
benefits, racially discriminatory admissions policies are
required to achieve the right racial mix, and therefore the
policies are required to achieve the educational benefits.
It is the educational benefits that are the end, or allegedly
compelling state interest, not “diversity.” But see ante,
at 20 (citing the need for “openness and integrity of
the educational institutions that provide [legal] train-
ing” without reference to any consequential educational
benefits).

One must also consider the Law School’s refusal to
entertain changes to its current admissions system that
might produce the same educational benefits. The Law
School adamantly disclaims any race-neutral alternative
that would reduce “academic selectivity,” which would in
turn “require the Law School to become a very different
institution, and to sacrifice a core part of its educational

___________________
      Nation.

8

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

mission.” Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 33—36. In
other words, the Law School seeks to improve marginally
the education it offers without sacrificing too much of its
exclusivity and elite status.⁴

The proffered interest that the majority vindicates
today, then, is not simply “diversity.” Instead the Court
upholds the use of racial discrimination as a tool to ad-
vance the Law School’s interest in offering a marginally
superior education while maintaining an elite institution.
Unless each constituent part of this state interest is of
pressing public necessity, the Law School’s use of race is
unconstitutional. I find each of them to fall far short of
this standard.

III
A

A close reading of the Court’s opinion reveals that all of
its legal work is done through one conclusory statement:
The Law School has a “compelling interest in securing the
educational benefits of a diverse student body.” Ante, at
21. No serious effort is made to explain how these benefits
fit with the state interests the Court has recognized (or
rejected) as compelling, see Part I, supra, or to place any
theoretical constraints on an enterprising court’s desire to
discover still more justifications for racial discrimination.
In the absence of any explanation, one might expect the
Court to fall back on the judicial policy of stare decisis.
But the Court eschews even this weak defense of its hold-

___________________
^4/       The Law School believes both that the educational benefits of a ra-
cially engineered student body are large and that adjusting its overall
admissions standards to achieve the same racial mix would require it to
sacrifice its elite status. If the Law School is correct that the educa-
tional benefits of “diversity” are so great, then achieving them by
altering admissions standards should not compromise its elite status.
The Law School’s reluctance to do this suggests that the educational
benefits it alleges are not significant or do not exist at all.

9

Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003)
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

ing, shunning an analysis of the extent to which Justice
Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U. S. 265 (1978), is binding, ante, at 13, in favor of an
unfounded wholesale adoption of it.

Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and the Court’s deci-
sion today rest on the fundamentally flawed proposition
that racial discrimination can be contextualized so that a
goal, such as classroom aesthetics, can be compelling in
one context but not in another. This “we know it when we
see it” approach to evaluating state interests is not capa-
ble of judicial application. Today, the Court insists on
radically expanding the range of permissible uses of race
to something as trivial (by comparison) as the assembling
of a law school class. I can only presume that the major-
ity’s failure to justify its decision by reference to any prin-
ciple arises from the absence of any such principle. See
Part VI, infra.

B

Under the proper standard, there is no pressing public
necessity in maintaining a public law school at all and, it
follows, certainly not an elite law school. Likewise, mar-
ginal improvements in legal education do not qualify as a
compelling state interest.

1

While legal education at a public university may be good
policy or otherwise laudable, it is obviously not a pressing
public necessity when the correct legal standard is ap-
plied. Additionally, circumstantial evidence as to whether
a state activity is of pressing public necessity can be ob-
tained by asking whether all States feel compelled to
engage in that activity. Evidence that States, in general,
engage in a certain activity by no means demonstrates
that the activity constitutes a pressing public necessity,
given the expansive role of government in today’s society.

10

GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

The fact that some fraction of the States reject a particular
enterprise, however, creates a presumption that the enterprise
itself is not a compelling state interest. In this
sense, the absence of a public, American Bar Association
(ABA) accredited, law school in Alaska, Delaware, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island,